uncreate nature and their non-dependence on another;
　　   the  self-nature   which  is  to  be  understood  by
　　   knowledge (in aaryasamaapatti) free from the caul of
　　   nescience (and its associated habit-energy). When it
　　   is asked. "Does that sort of thing exist?" who would
　　   answer, "No."? If it does not exist, for which  goal
　　   do  the  Bodhisattvas  cultivate  the  path  of  the
　　   perfections? For what reason do the Bodhisattvas, in
　　   order to comprehend  the true-nature, assume myriads
　　   of difficulties that way?(55)

　　   In short, Candrakiirti  explains the svabhaava of MK
　　   XV, 1-2, as the "true nature" of the scriptures, and
　　   in  a manner  equivalent  to the  dharma-sun  of the
　　   Ratnagotravibhaaga passage.(56)

　　　　  Finally, the denials  concerning  existence  are
　　   also  referred  to as the rejection  of four 'views'
　　   (d.r.s.ti). So MK,XXVII, 13:

　　   Thus whatever the view concerning the past,  whether
　　   'I existed', `I did not exist', `I both (existed and
　　   did  not exist)', `I neither  (existed, nor did  not
　　   exist)', it is not valid.

　　   Such passages undoubtedly support the frequent claim
　　   that the Maadhyamika  rejects all 'views'.  But note
　　   that  the  views  here  are  of  existence,  not  of
　　   causation; and that Naagaarjuna elsewhere adheres to
　　   the view of Dependent Origination, which in Buddhism
　　   would　　 be　　 counted　　 as　　 a　　 'right　　 view'
　　   (samyag-d.r.s.ti).

　　   V.   THE   THREE   KINDS   OF  CATU.SKO.TI,  VARIOUS
　　   CONSIDERATIONS

　　   It might be argued  that there are not really  three
　　   'kinds'   of  catu.sko.ti   but   simply   different
　　   applications   of  the   catu.sko.ti.   Perhaps   an
　　   exaggeration  of contrast  is involved  in using the
　　   word `kinds'.  Still I feel the word is necessary to
　　   counter the frequent  discussion  of the catu.sko.ti
　　   as though  the catu.sko.ti  is at hand  and the only
　　   difficulty  is in how to explain  it.  Hence  we may
　　   observe  that  the first  kind  of catu.sko.ti, in a
　　   disjunctive system, is explanatory of the individual
　　   propositions, and thus serves as an introduction  to
　　   the next  two kinds  or uses  of the catu.sko.ti, to
　　   wit, to apply to the problem of causation  or to the
　　   problem of existence. There were disputes concerning
　　   each  of the three  kinds, but it is especially  the
　　   causation  and  existence  applications  of the four
　　   alternatives  that occasioned spirited disagreements