(motivations  and  nescience), or  without  a  cause
　　   (that  is, by chance);  'motivations'  do arise with
　　   'nescience'  as  condition  (pratyaya) ;  and  since
　　   'motivations'  are  a  karma  member, have  a  cause
　　   (hetu) which is karma, hence the other karma-member,
　　   which  is  (10) `gestation'  (bhava)  `re-existence'
　　   (punarbhava).(63)

　　　　  But then what of Staal's  position  that even so
　　   (that is, allowing  the prasajya interpretation  for
　　   the catu.sko.ti  of existence), this  does  not save
　　   the prasajya propositions from mutual contradiction?
　　   Saying, "In rejecting  the third  clause, the denial
　　   of the principle  of non-contradiction  is rejected,
　　   not the principle of non-contradiction  itself,"(64)
　　   he interprets  the third proposition  in its literal
　　   form, denial that something both exists and does not
　　   exist. However, at least

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.17

　　   in   the　　 Tso^n-kha-pa　　 Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika
　　   explanation  that I gave earlier, it is not possible
　　   to understand the four denials in terms of existence
　　   just by their literal  form, because  one must bring
　　   in  the  theory   of  two  truths   (sa.mv.rti   and
　　   paramaartha) to understand  Naagaarjuna's  position.
　　   In such a case, the denial  of the third proposition
　　   amounts   in   commentarial   expansion   to:   This
　　   Maadhyamika   rejects,   in   the   absolute   sense
　　   (paramaarthatas), the simultaneity  of existence  by
　　   own-nature   of  that  efficient   entity  with  the
　　   nonexistence  by  own-nature  of  the  unconstructed
　　   entity.   In  short,  it  is   here   claimed   that
　　   `existence' and 'non-existence' refer to contrasting
　　   entities. Along the same lines, Naagaarjuna says (MK
　　   XXV, 14):

　　   How  could  Nirvaa.na  be  both  a presence  and  an
　　   absence?  Like  light  and  darkness,  there  is  no
　　   existence of the two in the same place,

　　   Thus  the  third   alternative   of  this   type  of
　　   catu.sko.ti  can  be resolved  in various  ways, for
　　   example, one may deny both a presence and an absence
　　   of nirvaa.na, adding  "that  is, in the same place";
　　   or, with a different  subject, adding perhaps, "that
　　   is,  at  the  same  time";   or,  with  still  other
　　   subjects, perhaps drawing upon the two truths, "that
　　   is, with the same truth."  All these  additions  are