This still leaves the important problem of
whether Naagaarjuna's statements are indeed
logically ture, and thus have truth or falseness
according to their logical structure regardless of
content, regardless of what is given. By "given,"
what is meant here is the usual 'granted, assumed'.
This involves a problem of translation, because when
Naagaarjuna's statements are assumed to be at hand,
the mere fact that there are marks on a page in the
English language purported to be his statements does
not prove that they faithfully relay Naagaarjuna's
intention by marks on a page in the original
Sanskrit language. Here there are two points: If the
statements do not have an easily isolated logical
structure, it is hazardous and probably
contraindicated to apply symbolic logic. Even if
they do have an easily isolated logical structure,
one asks if they are also so complicated that one
requires a symbolic representation to sift or show
truth and falsehood.
We may start to solve this problem with its two
points, by recourse to Weyl's remarks regarding
"constructive cognition":(10) "By the introduction
of symbols the assertions are split so that one part
of the [mental] operations is shifted to the symbols
and thereby made independent of the given and its
continued existence. Thereby the free manipulation
of concepts is contrasted with their application,
ideas become detached from reality and acquire a
relative independence." Thus Weyl, an eminent
mathematician, is frank to admit that the pure
operations of mathematics are independent of the
existence of the given. In the case of the
catu.sko.ti, the given is a rather considerable
corpus of material in the Paali scriptures and then
in Naagaarjuna's works, not to speak of
contributions by later Asian authors. And there is
the assumption that this corpus is at hand in a
translated form of English sentences that are
susceptible, in whole or part, of being converted