in  Sanskrit,  the  four  AAgamas).  Furthermore,  I
　　   cannot concede that the catu.sko.ti  is just a form.
　　   Indeed, if  Naagaarjuna  had  used  it in new  ways,
　　   Jayatilleke  would  have been more justified  in his
　　   attribution of misunderstanding to Naagaarjuna.

　　　　  Next, we observe by the foregoing materials that
　　   the  first  kind  of  catu.sko.ti  is  a disjunctive
　　   system  that  was  used  to  explain   the  Buddha's
　　   teaching.  The second, applied to causation, each of
　　   the alternatives  denied,  is a meditative exercise,
　　   and  besides   serves   to  classify   some  of  the
　　   philosophical positions rejected by the Maadhyamika.
　　   The third  kind, applied  to existence, each  of the
　　   alternatives denied, is another meditative exercise,
　　   and  besides  serves  to establish the  absolute  by
　　   negating   the   notional   activity   of  the  mind
　　   (sa.mj~naaskandha)   and   its   net　　 of   imputed
　　   qualifications.(59)

　　　　  The  priority  of  the  causality  to  existence
　　   treatments--as  I  have  already  insisted  upon--is
　　   consistent  with Naagaarjuna's  Madhyamaka-kaarikaa,
　　   which  devotes  chapter  I  to  conditional   causes
　　   (pratyaya) ,  beginning  with  the  denial  of  four
　　   alternatives concerning origination of entities, but
　　   in the same chapter begins to treat alternatives  of
　　   existence, nonexistence, etc. So MK I,6: "Neither an
　　   existent  nor  a non-existent  entity  has  a  valid
　　   condition  (pratyaya) .   What  non-existent  has  a
　　   condition? What  is the use  of a condition  for  an
　　   existent?" The next verse  (I,7) shifts  to the word
　　   dharma:  "Whenever   a   feature   (dharma)  neither
　　   existent  nor  non-existent, or  both  existent  and
　　   non-existent, operates, in that  case  how could  an
　　   operator-cause  be valid?" (and it is not valid.) MK
　　   chapters  III, IV, and  V, deal  with  the  products
　　   causes, namely, the sense

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.16

　　   bases,  personality  aggregates, and  elements, that
　　   amount to "all entities" (sarva-bhaava, IV, 7). Here
　　   again, "all entities"  presuppose  their arising  as
　　   products, so the  causality.  The  establishment  of
　　   causality in conventional  terms and of existence in
　　   absolute terms is therefore  implied in MK XXIV, 10:
　　   "Without   reliance   on  convention,  the   supreme