Now to the first point. Let us assume that the
catu.sko.ti statements do not have an isolatable
logical structure, and yet symbolic logic is
utilized. If one would grant the applicability of
Weyl's remarks, even if there were a valid
utilization of symbolic logic, it could not account
for the full corpus of the given, as the "given" has
been explicated earlier. So it may be merely a
section or subset of the given whose logical
structure is not isolatable. But then the
application of symbolic logic is a matter of
mastering the art of the symbols. And so one may
presume that it is an arrogated comprehension of the
given--although in fact the symbols are independent,
partially or wholly, of the given --whereby an
undeniably brilliant writer as Jayatilleke takes the
stance that he virtually alone understands "the
logic of the four alternatives," while claiming
that such a renowned author as Naagaarjuna cannot
understand it! Or
P.6
claiming that a modern writer like Robinson cannot
understand, because he does not apply the formal
symbolic system right, that is, has not mastered the
art. Thus the symbolic system becomes a vested
interest, the users jealous of its misuse, while
they champion its misapplication to the given, and
even to what may not be at hand, for example, a
correct translation of a passage from an ancient
text.
Then to the second point. I do not propose to
denigrate, in general, the employment of symbolic
systems for representing propositions of Indian
philosophy. But are the catu.sko.ti statements so
complicated that a symbolic restatement is
necessary, with the implication of an understanding
already at hand to certify the necessity? Perhaps
there is working a psychological factor which could
be called "wonder." What mathematics student getting
the "right answer" with calculus has not at times
felt a wonder at the ability of the
mathematics--beyond his native capacities--say, to