between the two main schools of the Maadhyamika--the
　　   Praasa^ngika   and   the  Svaatantrika-disagreements
　　   which would require too many technical  explanations
　　   to be treated in this article.

　　　　  Moreover, all  three  kinds  of catu.sko.ti  are
　　   found in early Buddhism and later in the Maadhyamika
　　   school.  The first  case where the four alternatives
　　   constitute a disjunctive system, with the individual
　　   terms not necessarily

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.15

　　　　  denied, was  well  represented  in  passages  of
　　   early Buddhism. as preserved in the Paali canon; and
　　   then　　 was　　 included　　 in　　 Naagaarjuna's
　　   Madhyamaka-kaarikaa  in the verse  about  the ranked
　　   instruction  of the Buddha.  The second case, denial
　　   of alternatives  regarding  causation, starting with
　　   the discourses to Kassapa and to Kaccaayana, is made
　　   much  of  by  Naagaarjuna   as  the  basis   of  the
　　   Maadhyamika, but does not seem to have been stressed
　　   as much  in other  schools  of Buddhism.  The  third
　　   case, denial  of  four  alternatives, has  important
　　   examples  in both early and later Buddhism, and,  of
　　   course,  is generously  treated  in the Maadhyamika.
　　   Therefore, when  Jayatilleke  says, "It  is  evident
　　   that  Naagaarjuna  and  some  of  his  commentators,
　　   ancient  and modern, refer to this logic with little
　　   understanding　　 of　　 its　　 real　　 nature　　 and
　　   significance,  "(57)  these   remarks   define   the
　　   limitations  of Jayatilleke's  own  views  of  these
　　   problems,  outside  of  which  is  his  own  "little
　　   understanding."  Robinson answered Jayatilleke  in a
　　   different  way: "And since the catu.sko.ti  is not a
　　   doctrine  but just  a form, later  writers  were  at
　　   liberty  to use it in new ways, doing which does not
　　   itself  prove  that  they  misunderstood  the  early
　　   forms."(58) This  is well  stated  and is meant  not
　　   only   to   reject   Jayatilleke's　　 criticism   of
　　   Naagaarjuna  and  others,  but  apparently  also  to
　　   justify the application of symbolic logic.  However,
　　   I have brought up sufficient  evidence  to show that
　　   Naagaarjuna,  in the matter  of the  catu.sko.ti, is
　　   heir  to and  the  continuator  of teachings  in the
　　   early Buddhist  canon  (in Paali, the four Nikaayas;