permanent and impermanent. That is not feasible.  If
　　   `both  the  permanent  and  the  impermanent'   were
　　   proven, one must also  grant  that the pair 'neither
　　   the permanent nor the impermanent' is proven.

　　   One should  note  about  this  passage  (Jayatilleke
　　   mistranslates  and  misunderstands  it) , (17)  that
　　   Naagaajuna  does  not here  deny  an alternative  of
　　   "both the permanent and the impermanent'' per se; he
　　   denies this for one and the same place.  This can be
　　   illustrated  by his  own  verse  (MK  XXV, 14, cited
　　   later), implying  that nirvaa.na  is present  in the
　　   Buddha  and  absent  in  ordinary  persons, but  not
　　   present  and absent in the same place.  Naagaarjuna,
　　   in the  present  verses  (XXVII, 17-18), also  makes
　　   explicit  his position  that the fourth  alternative
　　   (neither  the  permanent  nor  the  impermanent)  is
　　   derived  from the third one, and that the third  one
　　   (both  the  permanent  and the impermanent) combines
　　   the  presumed  first  one  (the  permanent) and  the
　　   second one (the impermanent).

　　　　  This brings  up Naagaarjuna's  remarkable  verse
　　   (MK XVIII, 8):

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.8

　　   All  (sarva) is  genuine  (tathyam),(18) or  is  not
　　   genuine, or is both  genuine  and not genuine, or is
　　   neither genuine nor not-genuine.  That is the ranked
　　   instruction (anu`saasana) of the Buddha.

　　   According to Candrakiirti's  commentary "all" means
　　   the  personality  aggregates  (skandha), the  realms
　　   (dhaatu), and the sense  bases  (aayatana).(19) See,
　　   along  the same  lines, Kalupahana's  discussion(20)
　　   about the "Discourse on 'Everything'"  (Sabbasutta),
　　   available  both in the Paali canon and in the AAgama
　　   version in Chinese translation.  Therefore  the word
　　   "all" in Naagaarjuna's verse amounts to "anything,"
　　   where the "anything"  is any entity chosen from the
　　   set  of 'all'  entities  according  to the  Buddhist
　　   meaning,  as  just  expounded.   This  agrees   with
　　   Bosanquet's  observation  that  the  content  of the
　　   disjunctive  judgment  "A  is  either  B or  C"  "is
　　   naturally taken as tin individual, being necessarily
　　   concrete."(21)

　　　　  Next, the interpretation of the word anu`saasana
　　   as 'ranked  instruction'  comes  from  observing  it
　　   among  the  three  'marvels'  (praatihaarya) of  the
　　   Buddha's   teaching,  of  which  the  first  one  is