I propose  that  it was  by  not  distinguishing
　　   these uses of the catu.sko.ti that there has been in
　　   the past various improper or misleading attributions
　　   to this formula.  For example, there  is the problem
　　   of  which  kind  of two  negations  is involved: the
　　   prasajya-prati.sedha   (negation   by   denial)   or
　　   paryudaasa-prati.sedha  (negation  by  implication).
　　   Matilal  concludes  that  the catu.sko.ti  is of the
　　   prasajya type and that so understood the catu.sko.ti
　　   is   free   from   contradiction.(60)  Staal   after
　　   admirably  explaining  the two kinds of negation (the
　　   paryudaasa  type negates a term;  the prasajya  type
　　   negates  the predicate) agrees with Matilal that the
　　   catu.sko.ti   exhibits   the   prasajya   type,  but
　　   disagrees   that   this   frees   the   formula   of
　　   contradiction.(61) However, when one considers  this
　　   along with my preceding  materials, one can promptly
　　   agree  with Matilal  and then with Staal  that it is
　　   the prasajya  negation  which  is involved  with the
　　   catu.sko.ti, nota  bene, the  four  alternatives  in
　　   their explicit  form applied  to existence,  because
　　   the proposition  "I bow to that Dharma-sun  which is
　　   not  existence"  is of the  prasajya  type  (confer,
　　   Staal: `x is not F').  But  when  one  examines  the
　　   propositions  of  the  four  alternatives  in  their
　　   explicit form applied to causation, one can promptly
　　   disagree  with Matilal  and then with Staal, because
　　   the proposition  "There is no entity  anywhere  that
　　   arises  form  itself," is of  the  paryudaasa  type
　　   (confer, Staal: 'not-x  is F').  And this paryudaasa
　　   type  is of the variety  implying  action, for which
　　   there is the stock example, "Fat Devadatta  does not
　　   eat food in the daytime."  But 'fat Devadatta'  must
　　   eat  sometime,  so  when? The  world  responds,  "at
　　   night!"(62) Also, the  entities  that  do not  arise
　　   from  self, another, both, or by chance, must  arise
　　   somehow, so how? Buddhism  responds.  "in the manner
　　   of Dependent Origination  (pratiityasamutpaada)." In
　　   illustration, the  first  two  members  of Dependent
　　   Origination  are: (1) `nescience' (avidyaa), and (2)
　　   `motivations'  (sa.mskaara).  `Motivations'  do  not
　　   arise   from  self  (motivations)  or  from  another
　　   (nescience) ,  or  from   both   self   and  another