is needed to prove it.The Buddha neither referred to
the skandhas constituting a being nor to the law of
pa.ticcasamuppaada in order to deny the existence of
a permanent ego-centric entity. Rather he made use
of the notion of 'I' which is taken to be the
tell-tale sign of an individual soul to refute the
'S aa'svatavaada. This approach appears to be all
the more intriguing as the Buddha is preaching to
his own disciples, and not to the non-Buddhist
ascetics. And from the dialogue between the Buddha
and his disciples it is obvious that his disciples
has not turned into supporters of this false view,
but had remained faithful to his teachings. Moreover
it would be preposterous to hold that the Buddha
actually supported the existence of a permanent
individual soul, although he denied its identity
with the five skandhas. What, then, is the reason
for this particular mode of preaching? We can
reasonably surmise that he was instructing his
disciples how to meet the challenges of such an
erroneous view. The inadvisability of trying to
discard this false view by referring to the Buddhist
doctrine is obvious, for the non-Buddhists cannot be
expected to have any faith in the teachings of the
Buddha. So the Buddha was teaching his disciples how
such false doctrines could be successfully countered
even while basing one's argumants on such articles
of faith as forming an integral part of the
philosophy they were criticising. He was trying to
show how the logical implications of one aspect of
this false doctrine would render null and void
another aspect of the same doctrine. In other words
the Buddha was teaching his disciples to expose the
contradictions inherent in the doctrines of the
'Saa'svatavaadins in such a way that even the
upholdres of this philosophy would be forced to
admit the justification of the criticism. In the
Anattaa-lakkhana-sutta the point which the Buddha
drives home is that the logical implications of the
notion of 'I'
P.415
which were acceptable to the protagonists of this
philosophy, would contradict the other part of the
philosophy, viz. the identity of the individual soul