suggestion, viz. soul is identical with perception.
b) Mahaanidaanasutta and the rejection of a dii-
ierent type of Satkaayad.r.s.ti (51)
Mahaanidaanasutta ( 52 ) rejects a new type of
Satkaayak.r.s.t.i which may be formulated as soul
possessing feelings. The relevant passage is given
below: "Herein, again, Aaanada, to him who affirms:
'Nay, my soul is not feeling, nor is it non-
────────────
(51) For Sanskrit parallels to different attaa
concepts discussed in the Mahanidaanasutta,
see, Nidanasa^myukta, C.B.Tripathi, Deutsche
Akademie der Wissenschaften Zu Berlin, IO,
1962.
(52) Diigha nikaaya, Vol.II, XV.31, p.67(PTS London,
1982), Dialogues of the Buddha Part II, p.64
(Pts, London, 1977)
P.417
-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the property
of sentience '--answer should be made: -'My friend,
were feelings of every kind to cease absolutely,
then there being, owing to cessation thereof, no
feeling whatever, could one then say: --"I myself
am'?"
'No, lord, one could not.'
'Wherefore, Aananda, it follows that this
aspect: -'Nay, my soul is not feel feeling, nor is
it non-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the
property of sentience'-does not commend itself".
Here the Buddha is teaching Aananda how to
refute the heresy of Satakaayad.r.s.ti. The view
that the soul is not feeling, but possesses feelings
shows that the feeling is not intrinsic to attaa but
external to it. It, therefore, follows that the
presence of absence of feeling should not at all
affect the basic nature of soul. But, as the Buddha
points out, our daily experience shows that in the
absence of all feelings there cannot be any
I-awareness which is the very essence of attaa. So
the feeling is not external to soul; soul cannot be
regarded as having feelings. The accepted idea that
attaa essentially means I-awareness goes against the
view that attaa has feelings.
The attaa heresy under discussion is concerned