attaa heresy: In the Mahaanidaanasutta  (54) we come

　　   across a heresy which does not conform to any of the

　　   types  mentioned   before.   The  relevant   passage

　　   recording a negative formulation the heresy is given

　　   below:-

　　　　  "Herein, Aananda, to him  who  affirms: 'Nay, my

　　　　  soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient'  -

　　　　  answer  should thus be given " 'My friend, where

　　　　  there  is no feeling  of anything, can you there

　　　　  say: 'I  am?'  'You  cannot, Lord,'  'Wherefore,

　　　　  Aananda, it follows  that this  aspect: 'Nay, my

　　　　  soul   is   not   feeling,  my   soul   is   not

　　　　  sentient'-does not commend itself."

　　　　  The view that the individual soul is not feeling

　　   and sentient is rejected because there cannot be any

　　   aareness of 'I' without feeling and sentience. Hence

　　   there  cannot  be  any  soul  without   feeling  and

　　   sentience.  Here  the  criticism  is  based  on  the

　　   assumption  of 'I-awareness'  as the essence  of the

　　   individual  soul.  The  proposition  admits  of  the

　　   existence of an individual  soul, asserts the soul's

　　   difference from feeling and sentience, and is silent

　　   about the question  whether  the individual  soul is

　　   eternal  or  not.  This is now type of attaa  heresy

　　   which is neither  'Saa'svatavaada  nor Ucchedavaada.

　　   Strictly  speaking this negative formulation  is not

　　   even all illustration  of Satkaayard.r.s.t.ti, as it

　　   denies   instead   of  affirming,  the  relationship

　　   existing between the soul and the skandhas.

　　　　  Against  our contention  one may argue  that the

　　   formulation-attaa is not feeling -was merely used to

　　   imply  that  the soul is identical  with some  other

　　   skandha.  In this case  this implication  should  be

　　   treated  as the main proposition, which is different

　　   from  the given  proposition.  If this  were so, the

　　   Buddhist criticism

　　   ────────────

　　   (54) Dialogues, Part 11, p.64; Diigha Nikaaya Vol.II,

　　　　   XV.30,p.67

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.420

　　   would  have  been  directed  against  a  proposition

　　   asserting  the identity  of soul with skandhaka  and

　　   not against  the formulation  of the soul  not being