the soul cannot be identical with perception. For in

　　   that  case  the perception  would  be rising  as one

　　   thing and ceasing as another.  It means that as long

　　   as the perception is in existence, it can be assumed

　　   to be soul (as body). But when it ceases to be, it

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.416

　　   can no longer  be equated  with  the  soul, for  the

　　   living  material  soul would be still  in existence.

　　   Hence the statement  about the perception  as rising

　　   as one and ceasing as another.  This reasoning  also

　　   holds good while showing the difference  between the

　　   perception  and soul as mind, for the cessation of a

　　   particular perception does not mean the annihilation

　　   of mind.  But this  type  of reasoning  is not valid

　　   when one assumes  the soul to be made of perception.

　　   In  this case the cessation of perception will auto-

　　   matically  mean  the  annihilation of soul, and con-

　　   sequently the argumant that the perception ceases as

　　   another  is  no longer  tenable.  This  part  of the

　　   discussion   appears   to  be  a  later   mechanical

　　   addition.

　　　　  Whatever  may  be the case, it  is obvious  that

　　   Po.t.thapaada is equating attaa with a skandhaka. In

　　   his  query  about  the  identity  of the  soul  with

　　   perception  as well  as in his suggestion  that  the

　　   soul may be made of four gross elements, or of mind,

　　   or  of  perception, Po.t.thapaada  is equating  soul

　　   with  one  of the  skandhakas.  He is not  concerned

　　   about  the  eternity  of the soul  or otherwise.  In

　　   other   words   we  are  dealing   here   with   the

　　   Satkaayad.r.s.ti, the root cause of all other  false

　　   views.

　　　　  In rejecting the Satkaayad.r.s.ti  the Buddha is

　　   not  denying the existence of attaa on the basis  of

　　   pa.ticcasamuppaada as he did while  instructing  his

　　   own disciples.  He is even accepting-for the sake of

　　   argument,   or   we   may   say　　 as   a   skillful

　　   means-Po.t.thapaada's  point  of view regarding  the

　　   existence  of soul or the constitution  of soul, and

　　   then rejecting  the suggested  identity  by exposing

　　   the   logical   inconsistencies   involved   in  the

　　   suggestion. He is showing that the acceptance of the

　　   view  that the soul  is made  of mind or four  gross

　　   elements   contradicts   the  other  aspect  of  the