For both James and the Madhyaantavibhaaga, these
　　   names and forms have an interreferential  character,
　　   for   they　　 are   established　　 through　　 mutual
　　   opposition--for   example,  subject  as  opposed  to
　　   object, thought  to thing, being  to nonbeing, black
　　   to　　 white--and　　 also　　 through　　 mutual
　　   interrelationship-for  example,  above, below, more,
　　   farther,  brighter,  similar, and  so  forth.  James
　　   holds  that  there  is no single, objective  quality
　　   that  does  not vary  according  to its context.  In
　　   Psychology  and Essays, he gives  many examples   of
　　   this  interreferentiality.  A few examples  from the
　　   visual sphere are that something violet appears more
　　   intense  when juxtaposed  with yellow;  black  looks
　　   darker next to white than to gray;  something bright
　　   becomes  dull  with  the  appearance   of  something
　　   brighter;  and  so  forth.(28) In  addition, objects
　　   tend to be defined in terms of their function, which
　　   again  expresses  a relation, namely, to human needs
　　   and purposes. Some qualities are clearly values that
　　   have been subjectively attributed and cannot be said
　　   to  inhere  in  the  phenomena  themselves, such  as
　　   preciousness,  dangerousness,  rarity,  beauty,  and
　　   repulsiveness.  Yet, James  points  out, these  same
　　   qualities  cannot simply be relegated  to the mental
　　   or purely nonobjective  realm, either, because  they
　　   have a physical  realm of activity  in their effects
　　   upon human physiology and even behavior.(29)

　　　　  Therefore,  while  reflection  seems  to  reveal
　　   definite  images  and objective  attributes, what in
　　   fact  is  occurring   is  a  complex  classificatory
　　   process  that  takes  into  account   a  variety  of
　　   contexts, functions, and relations.  These relations
　　   occur　　 within　　 experience,　　 forming　　 its
　　   self-referential   quality  and  supporting   James'
　　   thesis that what we experience is, after all, not an
　　   external world, but pure experience:

　　   My thesis  is that if we start  with the supposition
　　   that there is only one primal  stuff or material  in
　　   the  world...  and  if  we  call  that  stuff  `pure
　　   experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as
　　   a particular  sort of relation  towards  one another
　　   into which  portions  of pure experience  may enter.
　　   The relation itself is part of pure experience.(30)