P.234

　　   Paratantra means ruled by others (parava`sa)....  It
　　   is not constructed  (akalpita), is born from causes,
　　   and  is  thoroughly   inexpressible   (anabhilaapyas
　　   sarvathaa). (Y22)

　　   Further, paratantra is defined as the "pure, worldly
　　   domain"  (`suddhalaukikagocara), that  is, phenomena
　　   unobscured by ignorance or mental defilements (Y22).
　　   To see reality  in this way is not to lose sight  of
　　   the particularities, for example, the separate  eyes
　　   in the tail of a peacock.  It is simply to see their
　　   connectedness,  to  see  that   no  one  thing   has
　　   independent (svabhaava) existence.

　　　　  Unlike  Yogaacaara, James was making an original
　　   statement with his vision of a pluralistic universe,
　　   He devotes  at least half of A Pluralistic  Universe
　　   to refuting what he calls the "absolutistic  monism"
　　   of Bradley, Spinoza, and Emerson, because  they make
　　   an abstract  "whole" prior to the experienced parts.
　　   He also  rejects  theories  that  disjoin  phenomena
　　   totally  in  order  to  provide  an  alternative  to
　　   monism. James argues for an abandonment of these two
　　   extremes  on the ground  that they have no empirical
　　   basis:

　　   Neither abstract  oneness nor abstract  independence
　　   exists; only real concrete things exist.(46)

　　   In keeping with his empirical orientation, he argues
　　   first for a move away from the purely abstract  back
　　   to  the  realm  of  experience, wherein  things  are
　　   indeed  experienced  as continuous  and  as entering
　　   into  various  relations   with  one  another.   The
　　   ontological   implications   of  these   experienced
　　   continuities  and  relations  should  be taken  into
　　   account, he says, "in a world where  experience  and
　　   reality  come to the same thing."(47) In the case of
　　   any A and B, the very fact that they can enter  into
　　   relation   shows,  for  James,  that  they  are  not
　　   entirely  distinct, "not  separated  by a void," not
　　   mutually  impenetrable  or irrelevant;  rather, they
　　   are co-implicated  and "must  have an inborn  mutual
　　   reference each to each."(48)

　　　　  For James, the mutual  relatedness  of phenomena
　　   does  not  cancel  out  their  separateness, however
　　   mutually exclusive  the logical categories  of unity
　　   and disunity,  oneness and manyness, may seem to be:
　　   "In life distinct things can and do commune together