object, is said  to be empty"  (abhuutaparikalpo  hi
　　   graahyagraahakasvaruuparahita.h　　 `suunya   ucyate)
　　   (Y10). Sthiramati agrees with James when he explains
　　   that  both  subject  and object  are encompassed  by
　　   experience  or imagination, and  hence  inextricable
　　   from it:

　　   Indeed, it is not the case that  the imagination  of
　　   what is false  is the perceiver  of anything, nor is
　　   it perceived by anyone. (Y11)

　　   Imagination  of what is false is to be treated as an
　　   indivisible  unit.   It  is  not  the  perceiver  of
　　   anything   because   it  encompasses   its   object;
　　   similarly, due to its  enveloping  nature, it cannot
　　   be objectified.  James agrees that experience cannot
　　   experience itself:

　　   Experience in its original immediacy is not aware of
　　   itself, it simply  is, and the second experience  is
　　   required  for  what  we  call  awareness  of  it  to
　　   occur.(18)

　　   That  is,  the  process  of  witnessing   cannot  be
　　   witnessed;  it simply  occurs.  In James' words, "We
　　   should  say  'it thinks'  as we say  `it  rains'  or
　　   simply: thought goes on."(19)

　　　　  Therefore,   Yogaacaara,  like   James,  upholds
　　   experience as the sole reality. Yogaacaara treatises
　　   refer   to   this   postulate   as  cittamaatra   or
　　   vij~naptimaatra.  Although often translated as "mind
　　   only,"　　 the  use  of  the  noun  "mind"  tends  to
　　   substantialize  the concept in a way that Yogaacaara
　　   did not intend, by conjuring an image of a permanent
　　   substance and then inviting the label of absolutism,
　　   when  it is the  processual  life  of the  mind--the
　　   conceptualizing  process  and the emotions--that  is
　　   meant  here, and not a static  mental  substrate  or
　　   "cosmic   consciousness"　　 underlying　　 variegated
　　   experience.

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.227

　　   II.   EXPERIENCE  AS  A  CONSTRUCTIVE  ACTIVITY  AND
　　　　　　 ABHUUTAPARIKALPA

　　   The previous  section  discussed  how James  and the
　　   Madhyaantavibhaaga   both  treat  experience  as  an
　　   encompassing  category that envelops experiencer and
　　   content, or subject and object, in a single category
　　   through  which a definite  dividing  line cannot  be
　　   drawn.  That is.  experience  is an intermixture  of
　　   subject  and  object  and,  due  to  the  subjective