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William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inqui(15)

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     Madhyaantavibhaaga:

     It (an object) does not exist  as it appears, but it
     does not exist in every respect. (Y20)

     A   relevant   metaphor   occurs   in   the
     La^nkaavataara-suutra, which likens the operation of
     imagination   of  what  is  false  to  a  magician's
     conjuration:

     Depending  upon grass, wood, shrubs, and creepers...
     all beings  and forms  take  shape...  which  appear
     endowed  with  individuality  and material  body....
     Like-wise...  the  false  imagination  recognizes  a
     variety of appearances.(43)

     Experience may have an illusory aspect, like a magic
     show, but it does not arise  in a vacuum.  The grass
     and creepers in the metaphor represent the objective
     cause  (aalambanapratyaya)  or  basis  (a`sraya)  of
     consciousness,  the  "mere  thing"  (vastumaatra) ,
     while   the  beings   and  forms   are  the   verbal
     designations   of  the  experience,  which,  however
     illusory, is  dependent  upon  objects.  A classical
     Yogaacaara metaphor invoked by Sthiramati is that of
     a rope mistaken  for a snake in the dark or due to a
     magical trick:

     The  nature  of a snake  is absent  from  the  rope;
     therefore, the rope  is empty  with  regard  to that
     (that is, a snake) at all times, but the rope is not
     empty  in every  way (that  is, is not nonexistent).
     (Y14)

              P.233

      The Yogaacaara concept of "consciousness  only"
     does not imply the existence of the experiencer  and
     the nonexistence  of external phenomena, nor does it
     absolutize  abhuutaparikalpa  or aalayavij~naana  as
     the basal structure of abhuutaparikalpa.  Sthiramati
     is quite explicit about not intending to subordinate
     the object to the subject or make the object somehow
     reducible to the subject:

     Subjectivity  (graahakatvam) is not  possible  if no
     object  (graahya) exists.  (Y26) Since  there  is no
     object  in  the  absence  of  a subject, it  is  not
     possible  for there to be a subject when there is no
     object, (Y11)

     To uphold the sole existence  of the subject or even
     of consciousness  itself  would be to fail to attain
     the  nondual, transcendent  wisdom  of a bodhisattva
     that this text means to impart  (Y27).  It is simply
     that  the  subject  and  object, in  their  oneness,