everyday language (vyavahaara) and ultimate truth
(paramaarthasat), which is experienceable but not
verbally expressible. Therefore, Buddhist teachers
employ upaaya, skillful liberative techniques and
provisional teachings, in order to teach the Dharma.
The value and meaning of these upaaya inhere in
their practical results, so they are meant to be
empirically tested and then abandoned once the
practitioner has reached the goal. This attitude
toward the Buddhist teachings informs some of the
radical statements in Praj~naapaaramitaa and
Madhyamaka literature that there is no Buddha, no
Dharma, and no path to liberation. Although
Yogaacaara would not disagree with such statements,
they do not characterize Yogaacaara literature. One
can infer that one reason they do not might be the
justification for them that is provided by the
epistemology presented in this essay. The statements
"there is enlightenment" and "there is no
enlightenment" may be equally false insofar as they
proceed from the dualistic thinking of imagination
of what is false. However, the statement and
conviction that there is enlightenment is more
helpful and can be tested in practice with splendid
results. There must be some way to differentiate the
statement "there is enlightenment" and other
statements of religious and practical value from
totally deluded or nonsensical statements.
Dharmakiirti's pragmatic epistemology provides such
a method.
In conclusion. neither James nor Yogaacaara
completely devalues concepts as purely subjective
and divorced from phenomenal reality. They hold that
concepts serve as a bridge that can be crossed to
that reality through praxis and, as such, are
valuable and even indispensable.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have documented various parallels
between the thought of William James and early
Indian Yogaacaara philosophy as it is expressed in
the Madhyaantavibhaaga-`saastra and Vasubandhu's and
Sthiramati's commentaries upon it, focusing on their
views of experience and examining the analogousness
of their respective conclusions that subject-object
dualism is illusory, reality is not verbally