"idealism  par  excellence...   the  only  genuinely
　　   idealistic  school  in India,"(36) while  no less  a
　　   Buddhologist   than  Edward   Conze   calls   it  "a
　　   metaphysical　　 idealism,   which　　 teaches　　 that
　　   consciousness...  creates its objects out of its own
　　   inner potentialities."(37) These various assessments
　　   rightly acknowledge the primacy of experience in its
　　   constructive  or illusionary  aspects  for James and
　　   Yogaacaara.  However, they  do  not  recognize  that
　　   James  and the Yogaacaara  of the Madhyyantavibhaaga
　　   and its commentaries  do not deny  the existence  of
　　   phenomenal  reality.  Rather, they conflate  subject
　　   and object, inner and outer, into a single  category
　　   that includes  both.  The Madhyaantavibhaaga  itself
　　   never  states  that  abhuutaparikalpa   creates   or
　　   imagines the phenomenal  world;  what it imagines or
　　   creates  is  dualism,  most  notably  subject-object
　　   dualism. Sthiramati explains that this is what makes
　　   it imagination of what is unreal:

　　   The term 'unreal'  means  that  this  [the  external
　　   world]  does  not  exist  in  the  way  that  it  is
　　   constructed, i.e. in the form of subject and object.
　　   'Imagination' means that an object does not exist in
　　   the way that it is imagined. (Y13)

　　   James, too, encompasses  subject  and  object  in  a
　　   single  category  rather than reducing  the external
　　   world to the subject's consciousness.

　　　　  The   aforementioned   interpreters   of   James
　　   classify  him  as  a  metaphysical, or  ontological,
　　   idealist along with Berkeley, while the interpreters
　　   of Yogaacaara similarly place it in the metaphysical
　　   idealist camp. That they are not metaphys-

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.231

　　   ical idealists, but share  a position  of phenomenal
　　   realism, constitutes the theme of the next section.

　　   III.  THE EXTERNAL WORLD: A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE AND
　　　　　　 PARATANTRA

　　   Since both James and Yogaacaara  define  reality  in
　　   terms of"experience  only," their philosophies  have
　　   been  mistaken  for  metaphysical   idealism,  which
　　   denies  the  existence  of  the  external  world  of
　　   phenomena.   Yet  neither   philosophy   denies  the
　　   existence　　 of   external　　 objects   that   exist
　　   independently  of the experiencing  subject, however