《心是莲花》缘起
心是莲花是由居士自发组织建立的一个佛学平台。
《莲心论坛》交流
论坛事务区》 《莲心佛音区
莲心研修区》 《莲心红尘区
佛教人物
高僧|法师 大德|居士
信仰
菩萨信仰 诸佛信仰
您所在的当前位置:主页 >> 英语佛教 >> Research >>

William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inqui(25)

分享到:

     at  the  [successful]   adaptation?  It  cannot   be
     measured absolutely; the verdict will vary according
     to the point of view adopted.(75)

      In their pragmatic  theories of truth, James and
     Yogaacaara  were  both concerned  with the practical
     necessities  of daily  life, but also with the moral
     and spiritual  dimension  of life.  James was deeply
     interested  in religion but, in accordance  with his
     pragmatism,  was   more   interested   in  religious
     experience  and  in the fruits  of a spiritual  life
     than  he  was  in  the  doctrinal  or  institutional
     aspects  of  religion.   He  held  that  theological
     statements  can be subjected  to the  same  test  of
     truth as practical  ones, that is, by judging  their
     practical results:

     If  theological  ideas  prove  to have  a value  for
     concrete   life,   they   will   be   true,   for
     pragmatism.(76)

     Therefore,

     on pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God
     works  satisfactorily  in the  widest  sense  of the
     word, it is true.  Now...  experience  shows that it
     certainly does work.(77)

     His   Varieties   of  Religious   Experience   is  a
     compendium   of  the  fruits  of  various  religious
     beliefs and even different types of religious belief
     and temperament. These fruits include courage; hope;
     moral strength;  personal integration;  and lives of
     great   piety.   charitable   works,  and   mystical
     attainment.  Clearly, James' criteria  for religious
     truth--which   include  immediate   luminosity   and
     philosophical   reasonableness   along   with  moral
     helpfulness(78)--allow  of a plurality  of religious
     "truths."   He   acknowledged   and   defended   his
     conflation  of the notions  of "truth"  and "what is
     beneficial  or efficacious"(79) and concluded: "What
     other

              P.240

     kind of truth could there be, for [pragmatism], than
     all this agreement with concrete reality?"(80)

      The   Madhyaantavibhaaga   does   not  say  that
     religious  beliefs  and practices  are justified  by
     their   practical   consequences,  but  this  stance
     characterizes  Buddhism in general.  Buddhists  have
     long  upheld  the difference  between  conventional,