The definition of emptiness is wrongly understood if
　　   one thinks  that everything  exists  or that nothing
　　   exists.   For  one  thing,  this   would   mean  the
　　   nonexistence of emptiness, too. (Y14)

　　   Simply stated, for something  to be empty, something
　　   must exist! When Sthiramati says that

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　　   emptiness   would   not  be  possible   if  what  is
　　   designated   as   empty   were   nonexistent,   like
　　   impermanence and so forth, (Y14)

　　   he is appealing  to the fact  that  the doctrine  of
　　   emptiness, like those  of nonself, impermanence, and
　　   momentariness, arose in order to describe something,
　　   through antecedent predication.  That is, "emptiness
　　   pertains  to one thing  in terms of something  else"
　　   (anyena hi anyasya  `suunyataa  d.r.s.taa) (Y14), as
　　   when  it  pertains  to  a  monastery   in  terms  of
　　   elephants  or  absent  monks.(42) According  to  the
　　   Madhyaantavibhaaga,  imagination   of   the   unreal
　　   exists, and emptiness  is the absence of duality  in
　　   it. Sthiramati comments:

　　   Emptiness  is indeed this very thing, the absence of
　　   subject and object in imagination  of what is false;
　　   therefore, emptiness is not nonexistence. (Y 11)

　　   Here,  both  subject  and  object  are  held  to  be
　　   illusory;  it  is not  simply  the  object  that  is
　　   illusory. Being a Buddhist philosophy, Yogaacaara is
　　   just as concerned with the abandonment  of belief in
　　   a self  as it is  with  the  cessation  of  mistaken
　　   reifications of phenomenal reality.  The `saastra is
　　   very  explicit   in  stating  that  the  experiencer
　　   (bhokt.rvastu) is empty (`suunya) along with what is
　　   experienced (bhojanavastu) (Y53). It emphasizes that
　　   the subject  and object are inseparably  related  to
　　   one another, which  would not be possible  if either
　　   did not exist or were reducible to the other.  Their
　　   inseparable relatedness or mutual relativity is what
　　   the  commentary   on  this  passage   calls   "great
　　   emptiness" (mahaa`suunyataa)(Y 54).

　　　　  Having established that emptiness does not imply
　　   the nonexistence  of phenomenal  reality, Yogaacaara
　　   never wavers on the point that concepts  of external
　　   objects do not mirror or grasp those objects. Yet to
　　   say that experience is a mental construct (parikalpa
　　   or vikalpa) is not the same as saying  that what one
　　   is experiencing  is purely mental.  According to the