much   they   delimit   that   independence.　　 Both
　　   philosophies  maintain  an element  of  realism, but
　　   they nuance that realism  with a recognition  of the
　　   relativity   of  all  phenomena.   James'   view  of
　　   relativity  emerges  in his characterization  of the
　　   universe  as pluralistic, while  for Yogaacaara   it
　　   appears in the discussion of paratantra.

　　　　  James   was   quite   straightforward   in   his
　　   phenomenal  realism.  He characterized  himself as a
　　   "realist"(38) and declared that

　　   I  am...   postulating   here  a  standing   reality
　　   independent of the idea that knows it.(39)

　　   Some  of his colleagues, such as Rudolf  Lotze, held
　　   that a thing  that is taken in two relations  cannot
　　   be the same thing  in each, that  is, that  the M in
　　   M-L  must  be  different  from  the  M  in  M-N.  In
　　   opposition  to this atomistic (and Humean) position,
　　   James  asserted  that  "one  and the same  world  is
　　   cognized by our different minds."(40) He argued that
　　   the   various   relations,  being   conceptual,  are
　　   substitutional  and  variable, while  the  M in each
　　   case is the same piece  of sensible  experience.(41)
　　   This hearkens back to his psychology  of experience,
　　   which posits two phases: (1)direct sensation and (2)
　　   conceptual knowledge, which consists of establishing
　　   various  relations.  James  never meant  to deny the
　　   existence  of external  objects;  he simply insisted
　　   that there is no dualism  of subject  and object  in
　　   experience.

　　　　  Yogaacaara's   affirmation  of  the  reality  of
　　   phenomena  reflects  the necessity  of treading  the
　　   Buddhist   middle   path  between   the  ontological
　　   extremes  of  nihilism  and  absolutism, or negation
　　   (apavaada)   and   reification   (samaaropa)  ,   of
　　   existents.  In charting its course between these two
　　   extremes, Yogaacaara  used as its guiding  principle
　　   the  crowning  Mahaayaana   doctrine   of  emptiness
　　   (`suunyataa).  Emptiness  was  as  misunderstood  in
　　   second-century   India   as  it  is  today,  for  it
　　   perennially   is  mistaken   for  "nothingness"   or
　　   "nonexistence,"  a doctrine of totalistic  nihilism.
　　   Yogaacaara  was aware  of and consciously  addressed
　　   this misconception, sometimes  with a note of irony,
　　   as when Sthiramati comments: