elements, experience  is  constructive  rather  than
　　   passive.   James  asserted   that  "reality   is  an
　　   accumulation　　 of　　 our　　 own　　 intellectual
　　   inventions."(20) Yogaacaara's  parallel assertion is
　　   implicit   in  its  word  for  ordinary  experience,
　　   abhuutaparikalpa.  The verbal  root of parikalpa  is
　　   pari鹝!p, "to construct, create, imagine, divide,"
　　   a range of meanings that expresses  how this mode of
　　   experience  is  disjunctive  or dualistic  and  also
　　   constructive,   creating   the   reality   that   we
　　   experience. Thus, experience in both philosophies is
　　   not simply synonymous  with sensation or perception,
　　   but is an apperceptive and interpretative process as
　　   well.

　　　　  Both philosophies  divide  experience  into  two
　　   main  phases,  prereflective   and  reflective,  and
　　   demonstrate   various   ways   that  experience   is
　　   constructed  during  the  reflective, or conceptual,
　　   phase.  On the whole, James provides  more extensive
　　   exemplification, offering an Abhidharma-like catalog
　　   of mental processes, partly because  his thesis  was
　　   more novel in his intellectual  tradition and partly
　　   because he was doing pioneering work in the field of
　　   psychology  as well.  Yogaacaara, on the other hand,
　　   worked against the background of an extensive corpus
　　   of　　  Abhidharma　　  literature　　  (detailed
　　   psychophilosophical  analyses of the constituents of
　　   experience) and a pan-Buddhist  conviction  that all
　　   mental  phenomena  are constructed  or "conditioned"
　　   (sa.msk.rta).  Another  reason for terseness  in the
　　   Yogaacaara  case is that the text was meant to serve
　　   as a springboard  for a teacher's  oral  commentary,
　　   while   James  provided   his  own  commentary   and
　　   exemplification.

　　　　  James  and  Yogaacaara   similarly   describe  a
　　   prereflective  phase of experience, although  James'
　　   description  carries more rhetorical force, since he
　　   was going against the prevalent philosophical grain.
　　   He was arguing  against  Hume's atomistic  theory of
　　   experience  (which posits  no connecting  agent) and
　　   Cartesian and Kantian epistemological dualism. James
　　   describes the prereflective  stage of experience  as
　　   direct,  immediate, and  intuitive  and  calls  this
　　   phase  "sensation, "  while  the  subsequent  mental
　　   operations   performed   upon  sensation   he  calls