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William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inqui(4)

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     philosophy.  Given the state of Buddhist scholarship
     in his day, he certainly  would  not have been aware
     of the Yogaacaara doctrines that so closely parallel
     his  own.  While  the question  of the influence  of
     basic Buddhist  doctrine  upon James'  thought  must
     remain  an open question, there is no doubt  that he
     developed  his  philosophy  of  "experience   only''
     independently  of that system.  Therefore, these two
     highly analogous philosophies arose independently in
     second-century  India  and  nineteenth-century   New
     England.

     I. THE PRIMACY OF EXPERIENCE

     William James stated that he intended to formulate a
     philosophy  based  solely  on postulates  drawn from
     experience,  and he called  his  philosophy  radical
     empiricism:

     To be radical. an empiricism must neither admit into
     its constructions  any element  that is not directly
     experienced, nor exclude from them any element  that
     is   directly   experienced.(12)

     Guided  by this criterion,  he derived  what for him
     was the primary and incontestable fact:

     The  first  and  foremost  concrete   fact  is  that
     consciousness of some sort goes on... [;] 'states of
     mind' succeed each other.(13)

     That  is,  the  principal  fact  of  experience   is
     experience itself.  This fact, for James, is also an
     encompassing  fact.  Since an experience consists of
     its content, there is no reason, nor is it possible,
     to imagine an experience apart from its content:


     What  represents  and  what  is represented  is here
     numerically  the same;...  we must remember  that no
     dualism   of  being  represented   and  representing
     resides  in the experience  per se....  There  is no
     self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the
     consciousness   is   `of.' Its   subjectivity   and
     objectivity   are  functional   attributes   solely,
     realized only when the experience  is 'taken,' i.e.,
     talked-of,   twice...   by   a   new   retrospective
     experience.(14)

     Thus, for James, the content  should be included  in
     the category of experience rather than in a separate
     category. Just as an experience is indistinguishable
     from  its  content, so its  content  is inextricable
     from  the experience.  James  states  that the first
     great pitfall that his radical  empiricism  prevents
     is  "an  artificial  conception   of  the  relations
     between knower and known."(15)