I. THE PRIMACY OF EXPERIENCE
William James stated that he intended to formulate a
philosophy based solely on postulates drawn from
experience, and he called his philosophy radical
empiricism:
To be radical. an empiricism must neither admit into
its constructions any element that is not directly
experienced, nor exclude from them any element that
is directly experienced.(12)
Guided by this criterion, he derived what for him
was the primary and incontestable fact:
The first and foremost concrete fact is that
consciousness of some sort goes on... [;] 'states of
mind' succeed each other.(13)
That is, the principal fact of experience is
experience itself. This fact, for James, is also an
encompassing fact. Since an experience consists of
its content, there is no reason, nor is it possible,
to imagine an experience apart from its content:
What represents and what is represented is here
numerically the same;... we must remember that no
dualism of being represented and representing
resides in the experience per se.... There is no
self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the
consciousness is `of.' Its subjectivity and
objectivity are functional attributes solely,
realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e.,
talked-of, twice... by a new retrospective
experience.(14)
Thus, for James, the content should be included in
the category of experience rather than in a separate
category. Just as an experience is indistinguishable
from its content, so its content is inextricable
from the experience. James states that the first
great pitfall that his radical empiricism prevents
is "an artificial conception of the relations
between knower and known."(15)