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William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inqui(8)

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     perception, conceptualization, or classification:

     'Ideas'  about the object mingle  with the awareness
     of its mere sensible presence, we name it, class it,
     compare it, utter propositions concerning it....  In
     general, this higher  consciousness  about things is
     called  Perception, [while]  the  mere  inarticulate
     feeling of their presence is Sensation.(21)

      James describes the unity that characterizes the
     stage of sensation or immediate awareness, using the
     example of looking at a piece of paper. In the first
     moment of experience, the paper and the observer are
     unitary:

              P.228

     There is no context of intermediaries  or associates
     to stand between and separate  the thought and thing
     ... but rather an allround embracing of the paper by
     the thought.(22)

     To say  "This  is a piece  of  paper, at which  I am
     looking"   involves   interpretation,  which   is  a
     constructive or intellectual  process.  Indeed, what
     is experienced  is not an external  piece  of paper,
     but "the immediate  results  upon  consciousness  of
     nerve-currents  as they  enter  the  brain."(23) All
     that  one  can  really  say is that  a sensation  or
     experience has occurred:

     The paper  seen  and the seeing  of it are only  two
     names  for  one  indivisible  fact  which,  properly
     named,  is  the   datum,  the   phenomenon,  or  the
     experience.(24)

      The   Yogaacaara   (and   indeed   pan-Buddhist)
     equivalents  of  James'  "sensation"   are  spar`sa,
     literally "contact" between sense-organ  and object,
     and vij~naana, the "consciousness" that results from
     their contact.  The Madhyaantavibhaaga  commentaters
     echo James' description  of the prereflective  phase
     of experience:

     Consciousness  (vij~naana) is the cognizance  of the
     mere thing (arthamaatrad.r.s.ti).  'Mere' means that
     particular  attributes  (vi`se.sa) are not cognized;
     there  is  only  the  perception  (upalabdhi) of the
     thing itself (vastusvaruupa). (Y31)

     After the nondichotomous  and direct  experience  of
     the datum or mere thing, the sensations are digested
     or re-presented, as it were, and their  significance
     establsihed.   It   is   in   this   reflective
     phase--perception,    conceptualization,    or
     classification  in James'  terminology, and vikalpa,